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Brumbach: Smith v. Hooey

RECENT CASES

DENIAL OF SPEEDY TRIAL--MANDAMUS FOR
DISMISSAL
Smith v. Hooey, 89 S. Ct. 575 (1969).
In 1960 Richard M. Smith, while a prisoner in the federal
penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, was indicted in Harris
County, Texas on a charge of theft. He responded with a timely
request for a trial. After his other efforts to obtain a prompt
trial proved unsuccessful he eventually, in 1967, filed a motion
to dismiss for want of prosecution. When this motion failed to
elicit any response from the state, petitioner brought a mandamus
proceeding in the Texas Supreme Court asking for an order to
show cause why the pending charge should not be dismissed.
When his mandamus petition was denied petitioner applied for
certiorari to have the United States Supreme Court consider
the constitutional questions allegedly raised thereby.
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court declared that the
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had application to the
case at hand. The Court reasoned that the timely assertion by
defendant-petitioner of his constitutional right to a speedy trial
gave rise to a corresponding duty on the part of the state to
bring him to trial without undue delay.' The Court rejected the
state's argument that Texas was, in this instance, free from
was
Sixth Amendment constraints, observing that this argument
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After discussing the history and purpose of the Sixth Amend3
ment guarantees and finding a violation thereof by Texas, the
Court ruled that the order of the Texas Supreme Court (re4
fusing to grant mandamus) must be set aside and that the case
1 Ohio likewise conditions the right to a speedy trial on a timely demand
for one. State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 55 (1969). Quoting from pages 5657: "The law of Ohio is that the right to a speedy trial is not self-executing.
Affirmative action on the part of an accused in the nature of a demand to be
tried is necessary to invoke the constitutional protection." See also Amended Senate Bill No. 355 which permits a prisoner to obtain a trial on any
charges outstanding against him in Ohio, upon written request and notice
to the court where the charges are pending. The bill provides that subject
to reasonable continuances, the prisoner must be tried within 180 days of
the request, or else the charges must be dismissed.
2 Texas had contended that the state courts were without the power and
authority to comply with the Constitutional mandate where, as here, the
petitioner was under federal detention.
3 89 S. Ct. 575, pp. 577-579, passim.
4 That is, that the mandamus should issue and that the state should be
compelled to show cause why the criminal charge should not be dismissed.
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must be remanded to that court for further proceedings. While
the holding may seem somewhat ambiguous and nondispositive
at first glance, it becomes clear upon reflection, that the effect
of the holding is to compel the Texas Supreme Court to order
a dismissal of the charge against Smith. If the Texas Court
finds on remand that there has been no breach of constitutional
duty, this would be inconsistent with the U. S. Supreme Court's
holding. But if such a breach of duty is once acknowledged,
then Texas must necessarily fail to show cause why it should not
grant a dismissal for want of prosecution.
Therefore, without drawing unjustified inferences, one can
interpret the decision in the principal case as follows: Given
the recognized right to a speedy trial, and given the corresponding duty on the part of the state to affirmatively secure that constitutional right, the breach of such a duty will result in the inability of the state to show cause why it should not grant a dismissal. 5 This view of the case is reinforced by the concurring
opinions of Justices White and Harlan. 6
To hold that the state must dismiss is not the same as to
hold that mandamus should issue for dismissal. Such a use of
mandamus is clearly contrary to the recognized nature of the
writ.7

However, in the present case it appears that the writ is

usable to compel dismissal because of the unusual procedural
complexion of the case.
In summary, Smith v. Hooey seems to stand for the following propositions: that the constitutional right to a speedy trial is
not self-executing; that once the right is affirmatively demanded,
there arises a duty on the part of the state promptly to try the
petitioner; and that the state cannot escape that duty by showing
that it honestly misconstrued the law.
CHARLES

F.

BRUMBACH

5 It logically follows that, as a procedural matter, mandamus is a proper

proceeding to effectuate dismissal under the given set of facts existing in
this case.
6 See 89 S. Ct.
7 Wilbur v. U.S., 281 U.S. 206, 50 S. Ct. 320 (1930); State ex rel. De Ville
Photography, Inc. v. McCarroll, Judge, 168 Ohio St. 337, 154 N.E. 2d 640
(1958).
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